

A. Sen. McCarthy's  
Proposal

SENATOR MCCARTHY'S PROPOSALS

Since 1959, Senator Eugene J. McCarthy has been interested in the establishment of a Joint "watchdog" Committee on intelligence matters and has introduced resolutions to this effect in each Congress except the current one. Early this year, Senator McCarthy decided on another tactic and introduced a somewhat different resolution which would authorize the Foreign Relations Committee to conduct "... a full and complete study with respect to the effects of the operations and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency upon the foreign relations of the United States." Under the resolution, the Committee would report the findings of its study and investigation and such recommendations as it deems advisable to the Senate not later than 31 January 1967.

Senator McCarthy has made no secret of the fact that he believes his current resolution has a better chance of receiving favorable reaction than his earlier Joint Committee proposals, feeling that a sufficient number of Senators would see no harm in having an existing committee review the need for the establishment of a Joint Committee. Senator McCarthy has stated publicly his belief that the Agency's "highly secret role in the

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[redacted] Vietnam, Cuba and other crisis areas..." raises serious questions about the relationship of the Agency to the process of making and directing foreign policy. He feels that "...undercover and paramilitary operations have a direct bearing on foreign policy and indirectly on the constitutional responsibility of Congress for defense and war."

Senator McCarthy's current resolution has not been officially acted upon by the Foreign Relations Committee although it has been discussed in the Committee's executive sessions. As a result of these discussions, Chairman Fulbright, as reported in a Washington Post article on 26 April 1966, suggested that several members of the Foreign Relations Committee be permitted to attend Agency meetings with the combined Armed Services and Appropriations CIA Subcommittees. The Post article indicates that the CIA Subcommittee discussed this proposal at a meeting this past Monday. I am aware that this proposal was discussed. While I have not been officially advised, it is my understanding that the members were unanimously opposed to this proposition.

THE WASHINGTON POST

26 APRIL 1966

## Senate Seen Near Stiffer CIA Control

By Don Irwin  
*Los Angeles Times*

A secret meeting of seven senior Senators heightened speculation yesterday that an agreement to broaden Senate supervision over the Central Intelligence Agency is in the making.

The meeting was one of the rare business sessions of a special subcommittee that has been the Senate's only link with the affairs of the government's super-secret global intelligence agency.

Headed by Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the subcommittee consists of the highest-ranking Republicans and Democrats on the Armed Services and Appropriations committees.

Pending before Russell is a request from Foreign Rela-

tions Chairman J. William Fulbright (D-Ark.) that the senior Congressional committee in the foreign policy field be given at least equal access to data on CIA.

Fulbright's request takes on added point in the light of two developments of the past week. One was a vain effort by CIA to halt the slander trial in Baltimore of an East Asian-born agent who had linked another emigre to the Soviet secret police, apparently under orders from the CIA. The other is a report that at least five CIA agents were among Michigan State University specialists who carried out a foreign aid project in Vietnam.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, Tuesday, 26 April 1966

## SENATORS WEIGH NEW C.I.A. REINS

### Reins Weighed

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 25—A small group of Senators responsible for monitoring the Central Intelligence Agency met today to discuss whether their "watchdog" committee should be enlarged and its surveillance tightened.

The bipartisan group is made up of ranking members of the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations subcommittee dealing with funds for the armed services.

For many years the Senate group and a comparable group in the House, also drawn from the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, have constituted the only "legislative oversight" of the secret operations and the secret funds of the C.I.A.

For many years also a large number of Senators and Representatives have urged that these two groups be expanded to include members of the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees so that the activities of the agency would be subjected more closely to political considerations.

Although Senator Richard B. Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and the watchdog committee, has resisted these suggestions, in-

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formed sources said he called today's meeting precisely to consider such an expansion.

These sources said also that two recent disclosures of C.I.A. activities had apparently brought the whole issue to a head in the Senate watchdog group.

The first of these was the revelation that at least five C.I.A. agents operated in South Vietnam during the late 1950's under the cover of a multi-million dollar technical assistance program conducted for the government of the late President Ngo Dinh Diem by Michigan State University.

#### Intervenes in Suit

The second was the disclosure that the C.I.A. intervened in the slander trial of one of its agents, Juris Raus, an Estonian refugee, who was being sued by Erik Heine, another Estonian emigre. Mr. Heine charged that Mr. Raus had publicly called him an agent of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence agency.

In a public memorandum addressed to the Federal Court in Baltimore, the C.I.A. said it had ordered Mr. Raus to cease testifying in order to protect the United States foreign intelligence apparatus. Mr. Raus claimed immunity on the ground that the alleged slander had been committed in the course of his C.I.A. duties.

Several days ago Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to Senator Russell suggesting that they discuss the possibility of having representatives from his committee on the watchdog group. It could not be learned whether Mr. Russell has replied to this letter.

Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, Democrat of Minnesota, and a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, has expressed concern that the C.I.A. "is making foreign policy and in so doing is assuming the roles of President and Congress."

Mr. McCarthy has introduced a resolution calling for a "full and complete" study of the effect of C.I.A. operations on policymaking by a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee. He also favors expanding the present oversight group to include members of the Foreign Relations Committee.

#### Responsibility Cited

Today Mr. McCarthy said that, in view of the Michigan State and Raus cases, Congress would be rejecting "a very basic constitutional responsibility" if it did not begin "to exercise some degree of jurisdiction beyond what it is exercising now."

"Either the special group doesn't know about these things and it should, or it does know and tolerates them," Mr. McCarthy said.

Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Majority Leader, said with a smile that the pro-

posal to widen the watchdog committee was "not a bad idea."

In 1954 Mr. Mansfield introduced a resolution to create a 12-man joint committee—six from each house—to maintain scrutiny on the C.I.A.

The resolution had 34 co-sponsors. However, much of the support evaporated under the opposition of Senator Russell and Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts, who agreed with the then C.I.A. director, Allen W. Dulles, that the joint committee might jeopardize security.

When the Mansfield resolution finally came to a vote in 1956, 14 sponsors reversed themselves, and it was defeated, 59 to 27.

Besides Mr. Russell and Mr. Saltonstall, the present watchdog committee is made up of Democrats John Stennis of Mississippi, Carl Hayden of Arizona, Stuart Symington of Missouri, and Republicans Milton R. Young of North Dakota and Margaret Chase Smith of Maine.

B.  
Gold Coast

GOLD COAST ITEM

There has been some interest in the press in the past few days in "American spies" being permitted to rest and relax after assignments at hardship posts on the Gold Coast of Africa. The UPI ticker item said, "American spies may soon be able to come in from the cold--or heat, as the case may be."

The reference to the Gold Coast of Africa relates to a legislative proposal which members of this Subcommittee will recall as having been included in proposed legislation as far back as three years ago when some consideration was given to the introduction of omnibus type administrative amendments for the Agency. It was determined at that time to drop all administrative items in order to concentrate on our early retirement bill.

Included in the Explanation and Justification of the rest and rehabilitation legislation, was a statement in support of this provision. The legislation would authorize the travel of employees and their dependents, at Government expense, from designated hardship posts to areas where the employees and their families might relax and obtain needed freedom from climatic and other conditions which caused their post of assignment to be designated as a hardship post. As an example, a hardship post on the Gold Coast of Africa was used to illustrate how this authority might be utilized. There was no indication, as implied in recent press statements

*(Slate kept  
already has*

on this subject, that the Agency did in fact have employees stationed in this area. The Explanation and Justification was originally prepared late last year and was in Bureau of the Budget processing until transmittal to this Congress on 7 April 1966.

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PRESS ITEM FOR THE DCI W7

Date: 20 Apr 66

Item: # 21

Ref: #

UPI-157

(SPIES)

WASHINGTON--AMERICAN SPIES MAY SOON BE ABLE TO COME IN FROM  
THE COLD--OR HEAT, AS THE CASE MAY BE.

AND HE'LL BE ABLE TO DO IT ONCE EVERY TWO YEARS OR TWICE EVERY  
THREE YEARS.

THE CIA WANTS PERMISSION TO SEND ITS AGENTS--SOME PLACE WHERE  
THEY CAN RELAX AND GET AWAY FROM THE "CONDITIONS" WHICH PROMPTED  
THE NEED FOR RELAXATION IN THE FIRST PLACE.

THE AGENCY HAS ASKED CONGRESS TO PASS LEGISLATION THAT WOULD  
ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT TO PAY TRAVEL EXPENSES TO AND FROM THE  
VACATION SPOT FOR THE EMPLOYEE AND HIS FAMILY.

IN A LETTER ACCOMPANYING THE PROPOSED BILL, CIA DIRECTOR W. F.  
RABORN SAID THE PRIVILEGE WOULD APPLY ONLY TO THOSE AGENTS SERVING  
AT CERTAIN DESIGNATED HARDSHIP POSTS.

HE SAID THEY WOULD BE ALLOWED TO GO TO AN AREA WHERE <sup>THEY</sup> COULD  
"RELAX AND OBTAIN NEEDED FREEDOM FROM CLIMATIC AND OTHER CONDITIONS  
WHICH CAUSED HIS POST OF ASSIGNMENT TO BE DESIGNATED AS A  
HARDSHIP POST."

HE CITED AN EXAMPLE.

"IF AN EMPLOYEE WERE STATIONED AT A HARDSHIP POST ON THE GOLD  
COAST OF AFRICA," RABORN WROTE, "HE COULD BE PERMITTED TO TRAVEL  
ONCE DURING A TWO-YEAR TOUR OR TWICE DURING A 3-YEAR TOUR TO THE  
CANARY ISLANDS OR POSSIBLY CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA."

4/20--MJ426PES

Comment:

These comments represent the initial and tentative reaction of the Office  
of Current Intelligence to the attached item from the news services.

C. Commercial  
Aviation

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## COMMERCIAL AVIATION COMPANIES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 1950 the Agency acquired the assets of the airline which had been created by General Chennault in China at the end of the war and which had evacuated with the Nationalist Chinese to Taiwan. The original purpose of the acquisition was to deny this valuable aviation facility to the Red Chinese, but through the years events have time and again demonstrated the need for such a controlled aviation facility in the Far East. In recent years CINCPAC particularly has noted the very valuable contribution this commercial air facility has made to the U. S. interests in Southeast Asia. This facility meets all normal business requirements and is recognized in the airline industry as a member in good standing.

The commercial aviation complex has two main activities:

- a. The scheduled international Chinese flag airline which operates modern jet equipment as far north as Tokyo and Seoul and as far south as Manila and Bangkok. This is operated by a Chinese company known as Civil Air Transport Company, Limited, or CATCL, which does nothing but the international scheduled activity.

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b. A large contract activity providing airlift in support of U. S. programs in Southeast Asia. This is conducted by Air America, a Delaware corporation authorized to engage in contract airlift and to contract with U. S. Government entities, and Air Asia, a Chinese corporation wholly owned by Air America, which owns the majority of the equipment and operates a large, modern maintenance base in the south end of Taiwan Island.

Southeast Asia operations are divided between those in South Vietnam and those in Thailand and Laos. Most of the operations are under AID contracts.

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The AID work is primarily carriage of food and other supplies in support of AID programs,

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In addition, in Laos facilities have been called on for emergency search and rescue of downed American military pilots, and because of the familiarization with the terrain these have been effective. The equipment is varied and tends to be specialized because of the particular requirements.

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D. OXCART

E. Missiles in Cuba

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26 April 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEE

MISSILES IN CUBA

- I. Mister Chairman, you asked me in a letter of April 6 to comment on a lengthy article which appeared on March 3 in the Coral Gables Times in Florida. This article alleged that there are still strategic Soviet missiles in Cuba.
- II. The article is a mish-mash of conjecture, speculation, rumor, and outright misinformation. It contains no information that had not been previously reported and checked out in exhaustive detail.
  - A. I want you to know, however, that no reports of this nature are dismissed out of hand. We could not afford to do so--and indeed would be guilty of gross negligence--as long as we can not have on-site inspection of any possible missile sites in Cuba.
  - B. The day after the article appeared, our domestic field officers were in touch with the author to determine his sources of information and the nature of their evidence.

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1. At the same time, our field station in Miami responsible for Cuban refugee matters was checking out any Cubans cited in the article as sources for the allegation.

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4. The conclusion of the investigation was that all of the information on which the article was based came from missile and rocket publications, talks with Cuban refugees, and the Interim Report published by the Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 9, 1963, entitled "The Cuban Military Buildup"--a report relating to the 1962 buildup which led to the crisis in October, 1962.

III. The article itself, as I said, is full of misinformation

A. One photograph, for example, shows a missile on a tracked vehicle , and describes it as "similar to the US Pershing." Mr. Labelle showed this picture to Dr. Werner von Braun, and drew from him the statement that if it were indeed similar to the Pershing, the Cuban weapon could deliver a nuclear warhead to ranges in excess of 700 miles.

1. On this foundation, the article asserts that Cuba has a nuclear weapon which can reach "Cape Canaveral, Huntsville, and many lower southern military installations and cities."
2. In point of fact, the weapon shown in the photograph is a Soviet tactical missile, the FROG, with a range of 29 nautical miles.

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3. I wonder, for that matter, whether Mr. Labelle quoted Dr. von Braun accurately. The PERSHING's range, with an 800-pound warhead, is 400, rather than 700 nautical miles.
- B. Another photograph is described as showing a "naval-type cruise missile with a reported range of 150 to 200 miles," which again, of course, would bring Florida within range.
  1. The missile shown in the photograph is what we call the KENNEL. As a coastal defense cruise missile, it actually has a range of 25 to 50 nautical miles, depending on the elevation of the launch site. The ground forces version, mounted on a transporter-launcher, is credited with a range of 60 to 70 nautical miles.
  2. The article, however, goes on to speak of a cruise-type missile of medium or intermediate range. This is supposed to have been shown in the January, 1964, parade in Havana. We had complete coverage of this parade, and no such missile appeared.
- C. The article also brings up the ancient stories about a secret Soviet weapon called the "GOLEM," which fires strategic missiles from fixed underwater installations presumably planted by ship or by submarine.

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1. This one is straight out of science fiction. We have never obtained any credible evidence that the Soviet Union has, or is even working on, such a weapons system.
- D. I have given these examples, not for the purpose of arguing that two or three mistakes are enough to discredit the entire article, but as examples of how every single statement in an article of this kind is checked out carefully against all available information from all of our sources.



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- IV. There is a joint team of CIA and DIA intelligence experts, representing both military and Cuban expertise, which meets once a month, and more often if necessary, to assess the military posture of Cuba with special attention to the possibility that strategic weapons might still be on the island.

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A. The latest joint CIA-DIA report on this problem, dated April 19, concludes that:

"Cuba's present missile inventory is confined to defensive and tactical weapons... There are no strategic weapons or foreign troop units in Cuba at this time. While we recognize that some strategic weapons could be deliberately concealed or clandestinely reintroduced on the island, it is our judgment that this has not taken place."

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E. Vietnam

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26 April 1966

DCI BRIEFING FOR  
RIVERS SUBCOMMITTEEVIETNAMNorth Vietnam

I. The air war over North Vietnam has heated up considerably during the past several weeks. North Vietnamese jet fighters are showing increasing aggressiveness and willingness to mix it up with US jets.

A. This new aggressiveness on the part of Hanoi's limited number of jets is probably due in part to the fact that US air strikes in the Hanoi-Haiphong area have been stepped up during April, and have gone after targets in the sensitive northeastern area.

B. There have been six dogfights between US and North Vietnamese jets since April 17. Yesterday two MIG-21s jumped two F-4C Phantoms escorting a reconnaissance mission 60 miles northeast of Hanoi. The net result was one MIG-21 shot down by Sidewinder missiles.

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1. Altogether, the enemy has lost two MIG-21s and two MIG-17s in these encounters. A North Vietnamese pilot last week claimed to have shot down an F-105 Thunderchief; one missing aircraft which we attributed to ground fire could possibly have been shot down in air-to-air combat.
2. Our pilots report Chinese Communist markings on the enemy aircraft in some of these dogfights. This has gotten into the press and caused quite a bit of speculation. Actually, the North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist aircraft insignia are virtually identical--the only difference is two Chinese characters which are pretty hard to make out at Mach 2 speeds in combat. We have no evidence

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[redacted] to suggest that the  
pilots are anything but North Vietnamese.

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C. North Vietnam's jet fighter strength now stands at approximately 70 aircraft, 15 MIG-21's, and 55 MIG-15's or 17's.

1. To render these aircraft less vulnerable to US air strikes against their airfields, North Vietnam has recently deployed some of the aircraft from Phuc Yen to two newly activated airfields in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
2. Some five additional jet-capable airfields in this area are being worked on now to prepare them for handling jets.

D. The chances are that the North Vietnamese will continue their aggressive tactics as long as US air strikes in the "heartland" of the country continue.

1. A return to their former, more cautious policy may result only if they sustain heavy losses without a reasonably high score of US planes.
2. They are probably willing to accept a higher loss rate for at least a short period of time if they can significantly increase US air losses. So far, they do not appear to be accomplishing this.

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II. There appears to have been no change recently  
in the North Vietnamese terms for negotiations.

A. Earlier this week there was some interest  
in a report from Miss Pauline Frederick,  
the NBC correspondent at the United Nations.  
She told our delegation that an assistant  
Soviet press attache had told her Hanoi  
would negotiate if there were a permanent  
stop in our bombing of North Vietnam.

1. Yesterday the Soviet mission at the  
UN put out an official release re-  
ferring to Miss Frederick's report as  
a "complete fiction."
2. The Soviet official may in fact have  
made that statement to her, but it  
does not agree with our more direct  
evidence on the Soviet and the North  
Vietnamese position.

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C. Meanwhile the North Vietnamese continue to assert--as recently as this week--that their so-called "Four Points" form the only basis for a settlement of the war.

1. As you probably recall, these four points include our recognition of the National Liberation Front--the Communist political front for the Viet Cong--as the sole representative of the South Vietnamese people, and the complete withdrawal of the United States from South Vietnam.

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South Vietnamese Political Situation

III. In South Vietnam, the decree issued by the Ky government on April 14, promising elections for a constituent assembly in three to five months, has satisfied Buddhist leaders for the moment and persuaded them to call off their demonstrations.

A. The "struggle movement" apparatus, set up by Buddhist sympathizers in the northern provinces, remains generally intact, however, and the persuasive tactics of the new I Corps commander, General Dinh, have not yet restored full government authority to the northern cities of Hue and Da Nang.

B. Now that antigovernment groups are quieting down, the Catholics, the politico-religious sects in the delta, the Nationalist (VNQDD) and Dai Viet political parties, and other conservative groups are beginning to make their voices heard.

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1. These elements tend to fear neutralist or Communist inroads as a result of a Buddhist victory in any election, and may therefore hope to have the election postponed.

IV. For the present, the Buddhists appear content to leave the Ky government and the military Directorate in power until elections are held about mid-August, but there are still numerous pitfalls which may yet endanger government survival.

A. Chief of these is Buddhist suspicion of the government's intentions; the monks suspect that the regime may be fostering the opposition to the elections.

B. Another danger derives from the divisions now apparent within the military--from the Directorate on down--over how to deal with the unrest.

C. Over the longer run, differences are sure to arise over the purpose of the elections.

The government considers the assembly will be elected solely to draft a constitution.

The Buddhists look on it as a quasi-parliament, with power to confirm or replace the present regime.

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V. Although it is too early to speculate on the election itself, most Vietnamese believe that the Buddhists will be able to dominate an elected assembly, if not as a majority, by being the only disciplined element amid a collection of squabbling factions.

A. The opportunities for Communist infiltration will depend in part on candidate screening, but evidence of at least some Viet Cong penetration of the "struggle movement" gives grounds for concern.

Military Situation

VI. Aggressive large search-and-destroy operations mounted by US and other allied forces, and coupled with almost daily bombing from B-52s and locally-based aircraft, have continued to prevent the Communists from mounting any major offensives.

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- A. The Communists appear further to have refrained from significant military actions at the height of the recent political crisis, probably to avoid any move which would unify the Ky government and its critics.
- B. In the past few weeks, however, the Viet Cong appear to be stepping up sporadic attacks, particularly against US airfields, isolated South Vietnamese units, and hamlets and outposts in the delta; these actions seem to be accompanied by increased terrorism in the Saigon area.
- C. The Communists are expected to continue hit-and-run tactics, while positioning larger forces for possible offensives in the northern-most provinces, the highlands bordering Cambodia, and north of Saigon as the summer monsoon period arises.
- D. The enemy continues to increase his main force strength by infiltration and internal recruitment; strength of the main force units now amounts to about 80,000 men, including 11 confirmed North Vietnamese regiments.

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1. Our order of battle also now has identified at least five divisional headquarters, which can coordinate operations by several assigned regiments.
2. The allied forces appear to be in a better posture this year than last--both in terms of strength and intelligence--to blunt any major Communist attacks. There may, however, be some setbacks in store for government troops.
3. There are no signs that the Viet Cong have been measurably weakened by the constant allied pressure, but they do appear to be concerned about lower morale, growing food and supply problems, defection, and in some localized instances, ammunition shortages, disease, and serious losses.

Infiltration

VII. The Communists, in spite of increasing US aerial interdiction, are continuing to move supplies south along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

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- A. The US B-52 strike against the key Mu Gia Pass chokepoint appears to have had only limited success; guerrilla teams and aerial observers observed new truck movement in the Pass area only a few days after the massive attack. A second strike was made yesterday but no assessment is in yet.
- B. US pilots claim to have destroyed or damaged more than 600 trucks since 1 March, first in strikes against roads in south Laos, but despite such losses the Communists are managing to move substantial quantities of supplies south through the Laotian Panhandle toward South Vietnam.
- C. The Communists also have been improving their road net in southeastern Laos.
1. They have completed a second supply route into the Laos Panhandle from North Vietnam, south of and roughly parallel to the Mu Gia artery. This new road will facilitate Communist supply movement into Laos while at the same time making the US interdiction task more difficult.

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2. In south Laos, the Communists--apparently with at least the acquiescence of the Cambodians--have completed a road leading from northeastern Cambodia through the southeastern tip of Laos to the South Vietnamese border. Reports indicate that moderate amounts of rice and other foodstuffs are moving from Cambodia to South Vietnam along this route.

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